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Bond v. United States: Concurring in the 
Judgment
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz*
Introduction
When Mr. Bond first impregnated Mrs. Bond’s best friend, the in-
ternational Chemical Weapons Convention was probably the furthest 
thing from his mind.1 But when Mrs. Bond found out, her thoughts 
ran right to potassium dichromate and 10-chloro-10H-phenoxarsine.
Mrs. Bond promptly decided to spread these chemicals on the 
pregnant paramour’s doorknob and mailbox.2 And even though the 
“best friend” was scarcely harmed (because the chemicals were far-
cically easy to spot), Mrs. Bond found herself charged with viola-
tion of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.3 Im-
probably enough, this lurid local drama, which played out entirely 
in Norristown, Pennsylvania, would present momentous constitu-
tional questions about the foreign relations law of the United States. 
Now, the Chemical Weapons Convention was quite obviously in-
spired by a more fearsome set of concerns—paradigmatically, state 
use of chemical weapons in wartime and/or terrorist use of chemi-
cal weapons against civilian populations. No one suggests that the 
treaty-makers had jilted wives like Mrs. Bond in mind.4 And the 
federal statute was expressly enacted to implement this treaty. But, 
nevertheless, the statute seemed to reach Mrs. Bond’s conduct, and 
 * Professor of law, Georgetown University Law Center; senior fellow in constitu-
tional studies, Cato Institute. Thanks to Stacey L. Bennett and Nita A. Farahany. And 
thanks, also, to Stephanie Freudenberg and the Georgetown Law Library, for first-rate 
research assistance.
1 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
2 Id. at 2085.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 2088.
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an ambitious assistant United States attorney decided to make it a 
federal case. 
Mrs. Bond entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right 
to appeal. The government, bizarrely, started by contending that 
Mrs. Bond lacked standing to make a Tenth Amendment/enumer-
ated powers argument, even though her liberty was on the line; 
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, oddly, agreed.5 
Then, though, the government reversed course and confessed error: 
of course a criminal defendant has standing to argue that Congress 
lacked power to enact the statute at issue.6 And in 2011, the Supreme 
Court reversed 9-0.7 
This term, the case was back at the Supreme Court on the merits. 
Mrs. Bond argued, first, that the statute did not reach her conduct—a 
statutory interpretation argument that turned out to have surprising 
traction. 
Second, in the alternative, Mrs. Bond argued that if the statute 
does reach her conduct, then Congress had no constitutional power 
to enact it and it could not be applied to her. Congress’s legislative 
powers are enumerated, primarily in Article I, Section 8. So, as a gen-
eral matter, for every federal statute, one ought to be able to find a 
corresponding power over the subject matter in the enumerated list. 
Mrs. Bond took a look at the list and argued that she found no enu-
merated power over purely local chemical assault. 
The government, oddly, largely conceded this point, waiving any 
argument that this statute was a regulation of interstate commerce.8 
Instead, the government made the following remarkable assertion. It 
argued that because the United States had entered into a treaty con-
cerning chemical weapons, Congress automatically has the power 
to enact a statute on this subject, even if it would have lacked this 
power otherwise. It argued, in other words, that a treaty can increase 
the legislative power of Congress. 
And indeed, in 1920, the Supreme Court seemed to say exactly that. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote for the Court: “If the treaty is 
valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the [implementing] 
5 United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2009). 
6 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2086.
7 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2359 (2011).
8 United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 151 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012).
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statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to ex-
ecute the powers of the government.”9
This was the proposition that caught the interest of the Cato Insti-
tute. In 2005, in the Harvard Law Review, I argued that this sentence 
is fundamentally inconsistent with constitutional text and structure, 
and that it should be overruled.10 If a treaty could increase the leg-
islative powers of Congress, then enumerating those powers in the 
first place was a fool’s errand; the president and Senate, with the con-
currence of, say, Zimbabwe, could easily circumvent the enumera-
tion and vest Congress with plenary legislative power. Cato agreed 
(as did the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Atlantic 
Legal Foundation), and so we filed an amicus brief to that effect,11 
based on my article.12 We argued that Missouri v. Holland was wrong: 
a treaty cannot increase the legislative power of Congress.
In what must be a new record for a criminal defendant, the Su-
preme Court again ruled for Mrs. Bond, and again the vote was 9-0.13 
(Meanwhile, for the Obama administration, this is one of at least a 
dozen unanimous losses in the last three terms,14 which may also be 
some sort of record.) Mrs. Bond’s conviction was overturned.
But although all nine justices agreed about the result, there were 
substantial disagreements about the reasoning. Unfortunately, Chief 
Justice John Roberts, writing for the Court, managed to sidestep the 
constitutional issue, expressing no view on the important constitu-
tional question of whether a treaty can increase the legislative power 
of Congress. But the Court’s opinion is nevertheless worth studying, 
if only as an object lesson in dodgy statutory interpretation. Mean-
while, Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito 
rightly did reach the important constitutional question, each writing 
9 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
10 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1867 
(2005).
11 Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, and 
Atlantic Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 2, Bond v. United States, 134 S. 
Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12-158) [hereinafter Cato Brief].
12 Rosenkranz, supra note 10.
13 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (2014). 
14 See Ilya Shapiro, No, Mr. President, You Can’t Do Whatever You Want, Forbes, June 
27, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilyashapiro/2014/06/27/no-mr-president- 
you-cant-do-whatever-you-want.
CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW
288
a separate concurrence in the judgment. Collectively, these three 
opinions grapple with the intertwined issues of (1) the scope of the 
treaty power and (2) the scope of Congress’s power to legislate pur-
suant to treaty. Because these issues have rarely arisen, these con-
currences stand as some of the most scholarly and thoughtful treaty 
opinions ever to emanate from the Supreme Court. 
I. Was Mrs. Bond’s Conduct Covered by the Statute?
The Court began with the statutory interpretation question: Did 
the statute reach Mrs. Bond’s conduct? This is standard practice. The 
Court does and should avoid difficult constitutional questions when 
it fairly can,15 and if Mrs. Bond’s conduct was not covered by the 
statute, then that is the end of the case. It is undisputed that Mrs. 
Bond possessed and used a chemical to harm her neighbor. But did 
this constitute possession and use of a “chemical weapon” under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act?
The statute provides that no person may knowingly “develop, 
produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, 
stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemi-
cal weapon.”16 At first glance, the key term is ambiguous. Mrs. Bond 
clearly possessed and used something, but was it a “chemical weapon”? 
Under normal circumstances, this might pose an interpretive riddle, 
but in this case, Congress itself has expressly defined the term. The 
statute defines the phrase “chemical weapon” to mean “[a] toxic chem-
ical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohib-
ited under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent 
with such a purpose.”17 Now, this definition itself may appear to be 
ambiguous. A “chemical weapon” is a “toxic chemical,” but this just 
begs the question: did Mrs. Bond possess and use a “toxic chemical”? 
And even if so, was her “purpose not prohibited”? Happily, Con-
gress expressly defined both of these terms too. A “toxic chemical” 
is defined very broadly as “any chemical which through its chemical 
action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or 
15 Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam); see also 
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
16 18 U. S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
17 18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
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permanent harm to humans or animals.”18 To remove all doubt, the 
definition goes on to specify that “[t]he term includes all such chemi-
cals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and 
regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions 
or elsewhere.”19 And a “purpose not prohibited” is “[a]ny peaceful 
purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or 
pharmaceutical activity or other activity.”20 
In short, the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act 
is a model of legislative drafting in one important sense. Several of 
its key terms may be ambiguous at first glance, but Congress has ex-
pressly defined these terms. Each time a term seems to pose an interpre-
tive puzzle, there is a definitional provision that solves the puzzle.
Working bottom to top through these interlocking definitions 
takes some doing, but there is nothing ambiguous about the process 
or the result. Definitional provisions are like algebraic substitutions: 
where one sees X, one should read Y. Here is Justice Scalia, demon-
strating, in one paragraph, how this is done: 
[1] Bond possessed and used “chemical[s] which through 
[their] chemical action on life processes can cause death, 
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm.” [2] Thus, 
she possessed “toxic chemicals.” [3] And, because they were 
not possessed or used only for a “purpose not prohibited,” 
§229F(1)(A), they were “chemical weapons.” Ergo, Bond 
violated the Act. End of statutory analysis, I would have 
thought.21
Alas, this inexorable logic garnered only three votes at the Su-
preme Court. “The Court does not think the interpretive exercise 
so simple. But that is only because its result-driven antitextualism 
befogs what is evident.”22
The Court’s basic objection to Justice Scalia’s analysis “is that it 
would ‘dramatically intrude[] upon traditional state criminal juris-
diction,’ and we avoid reading statutes to have such reach in the 
18 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A) (emphasis added). 
19 Id. (emphasis added).
20 18 U.S.C. § 229F(7)(A) (emphasis added).
21 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2094 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment).
22 Id. at 2095.
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absence of a clear indication that they do.”23 This, the Court suggests, 
is a fundamental principle of federal statutory interpretation: “it is 
appropriate to refer to basic principles of federalism embodied in the 
Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a federal statute.”24 
Fair enough, and this solicitude for federalism is to be applauded, 
but the key word here is “ambiguity.” As the Court acknowledges, this 
principle does not come into play if the statute is clear. And, again, at 
the end of the chain of statutory definitions in this case is a provision 
that could not be clearer: the statute applies to chemicals that “can cause 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm.” It is undisputed 
that Mrs. Bond’s chosen chemicals can cause such harm. In order to 
bring its federalism canon into play, the Court must struggle mightily to 
find ambiguity in a carefully defined term. The effort is unpersuasive. 
The Court gets off on the wrong foot with the first sentence of 
analysis: “Section 229 exists to implement the Convention, so we 
begin with that international agreement.”25 In a question of statu-
tory interpretation, one should always begin not with why a statute 
purportedly exists but with what it actually says.26 Here, the Court 
begins, not with the text of the statute, or even the text of the treaty, 
but rather with the Court’s own guess as to the intention of the treaty 
makers. “There is no reason to think the sovereign nations that rati-
fied the Convention were interested in anything like Bond’s common 
law assault.”27 Probably true, but surely beside the point. Mrs. Bond 
was charged with violating a United States statute, duly passed by 
the House of Representatives, passed by the Senate, and signed by 
the president. The private intentions of, say, Vladimir Putin, should 
have nothing to do with its interpretation.
In any case, after positing the private intentions of foreign sover-
eigns, the Court then turns to the statute itself, ostensibly to divine 
the meaning of “chemical weapon.” But here again, the Court starts 
off on the wrong foot: “To begin, as a matter of natural meaning, 
an educated user of English would not describe Bond’s crime as 
23 Id. at 2088 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 
(1971)).
24 Id. at 2090.
25 Id. at 2087.
26 See, e.g., U.S. v. Alvarez, 511 U.S. 350, 356 (1994) (“When interpreting a statute, we 
look first and foremost to its text.”).
27 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087.
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involving a ‘chemical weapon.’”28 True, but irrelevant. There is no 
call to speculate about the “natural meaning” of “chemical weapon,” 
because Congress has defined the term. 
To understand how statutory definitions work, it is useful 
first to consider how statutes work without them. If Congress 
uses a vague phrase . . . without defining it, then courts must 
give the phrase content by bringing various tools of statutory 
interpretation to bear on the ambiguity . . . . Courts might 
look the words up in a dictionary. They might look to other 
uses of the phrase in the same statute or perhaps in other 
statutes and compare contexts. They might look to committee 
reports and other forms of legislative history. They might 
try to discern the purpose of the act . . . . Conversely, when 
Congress inserts a definitional section, courts resort not to 
their usual grab bags of interpretive tools, but to the statutory 
definition alone. Congress in effect replaces a complicated 
and fuzzy algorithm with a simple cut-and-paste function: 
“Where one sees X, one shall read Y.” No guesswork is 
necessary . . . . Cut and paste.29 
The entire point of a statutory definition is to obviate an unstruc-
tured judicial inquiry into “natural meaning.” When Congress fails 
to define a term, the Court may try to discern its “natural mean-
ing,” and this judicially derived definition will win the day. But 
when Congress does define a term, the congressional definition 
must trump any judicial divination of “natural meaning” in exactly 
the same way, and for the same reason, that statutes trump common 
law.30 This is so even if—one might say especially if—the legislative 
28 Id. at 2090.
29 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. 
L. Rev. 2085, 2103–04 (2002).
30 Id. at 2107; see also id. at 2119 (“The ‘interpretive indicia’ of a text depend entirely 
on the interpretive methodology applied to it. That is why it is essential, when asking 
whether Congress may pass a general prospective interpretive rule, to ask first: what 
is the constitutional status of the rule that Congress would displace? To claim, as [Laurence] 
Tribe does, that all ‘rules of construction contained in the United States Code’ may be 
trumped by ‘other interpretive indicia’ is in effect to claim that all the interpretive tools 
currently used by the courts—even mere syntactical canons—are constitutionally 
required. Since it is implausible that the Constitution requires a completely specified 
interpretive methodology, this view amounts to an untenable endorsement of imperial 
judging at the expense of democratic legislation.”(footnotes omitted) (emphasis in 
original)).
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definition differs substantially from common usage. As Justice Sca-
lia writes:
There is no opinion of ours, and none written by any court 
or put forward by any commentator since Aristotle, which 
says, or even suggests, that “dissonance” between ordinary 
meaning and the unambiguous words of a definition is to be 
resolved in favor of ordinary meaning. If that were the case, 
there would hardly be any use in providing a definition.31
To see the point most simply, consider the use of dictionaries. The 
judicial search for “natural meaning” will often begin with a turn to 
dictionaries. But an immediate problem presents itself. To which dic-
tionary should courts turn? In this case, the Court chooses Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary and The American Heritage Diction-
ary.32 But how can it be sure that Congress didn’t have the Oxford 
English Dictionary in mind instead?33 
Rather than leaving potential ambiguities to the vagaries of “natu-
ral meaning” or dictionary roulette, Congress may choose to define 
key terms itself. In effect, Congress declares that, for certain speci-
fied terms, the U.S. Code itself is the official and exclusive diction-
ary.34 When Congress does so, its definition should be the final word 
on the matter. The Court has generally been perfectly clear about 
this point: “When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must 
follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary 
meaning.”35
But in Bond, the Court turns this principle on its head. In Part III-B, 
the heart of the Court’s opinion, it quotes both Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary and The American Heritage Dictionary. Yet not 
once in this section does it quote, let alone parse, the definition that 
Congress itself provided in the U.S. Code. Only by overlooking Con-
gress’s definition altogether does the Court find the ambiguity that 
it seeks. In an act of interpretive perversity, the Court (1) posits a 
“natural meaning” of “chemical weapons,” (2) declares that “natural 
31 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
32 Id. at 2090 (majority opinion).
33 See generally Rosenkranz, supra note 29, at 2147.
34 See id. at 2103–06.
35 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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meaning” to be ambiguous, and then (3) holds that this ambiguous 
“natural meaning” trumps Congress’s own clear definition. 
Here is the Court, explaining the source of the supposed ambiguity:
[A]mbiguity derives from the improbably broad reach of 
the key statutory definition given the term—“chemical 
weapon”—being defined; the deeply serious consequences 
of adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of any 
apparent need to do so in light of the context from which the 
statute arose—a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism. 
We conclude that, in this curious case, we can insist on a clear 
indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes, 
before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way 
that intrudes on the police power of the States.36
And here is Justice Scalia’s devastating reply: “Imagine what fu-
ture courts can do with that judge-empowering principle: Whatever 
has improbably broad, deeply serious, and apparently unnecessary 
consequences . . . is ambiguous!”37
Oddly, the Court seems to have overlooked the strongest precedent 
for its position. In Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, the Court seemed 
to allow “common usage” to trump the Dictionary Act, holding that 
a general definition at the beginning of the U.S. Code was not a clear 
enough statement to overcome a particular federalism presump-
tion of statutory interpretation.38 This holding is much closer to the 
Court’s approach than any of the other cases on which it relies. 
In any event, though, Will is distinguishable and Justice Scalia 
would still have the better of the argument. The Dictionary Act is 
generally applicable throughout the U.S. Code, and perhaps federal-
ism canons are “constitutional default rule[s] required by the Tenth 
Amendment,”39 which cannot be reversed wholesale by a global inter-
pretive rule. But in this case, the definitional provision is not gener-
ally applicable; it is statute-specific. When a statute specifies that X shall 
mean Y for purposes of that particular statute, that definition should con-
stitute a clear enough statement to overcome any such presumption.40 
36 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090.
37 Id. at 2096 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
38 491 U.S. 58, 69–70 (1989).
39 See Rosenkranz, supra note 29, at 2122.
40 See id. at 2121–23.
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The silver lining of the Court’s statutory sleight-of-hand is that it 
may be limited to these facts. At each key point in its analysis, the 
Court is at pains to emphasize that this is an “unusual case.”41 One 
senses that the Court—or at least the chief justice—was a bit un-
nerved by Justice Scalia’s prediction that the majority’s “interpretive 
principles never before imagined . . . will bedevil our jurisprudence 
(and proliferate litigation) for years to come.”42 
Not so, coos the Court, for this is a “curious case.”43
This case is unusual, and our analysis is appropriately limited. Our 
disagreement with our colleagues reduces to whether section 229 is 
“utterly clear.” Post, at 5 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). 
We think it is not, given that the definition of “chemical 
weapon” in a particular case can reach beyond any normal 
notion of such a weapon, that the context from which the 
statute arose demonstrates a much more limited prohibition 
was intended, and that the most sweeping reading of the 
statute would fundamentally upset the Constitution’s balance 
between national and local power. This exceptional convergence 
of factors gives us serious reason to doubt the Government’s 
expansive reading of section 229, and calls for us to interpret 
the statute more narrowly.44
Happily, this sounds almost like the infamous Bush v. Gore one-
train-only disclaimer: “Our consideration is limited to the present 
circumstances.”45 It is to be hoped that “[t]his exceptional conver-
gence of factors” will never converge again, and the Court will re-
turn to its prior practice of honoring statutory definitions provided 
by Congress.
In any event, the Court concluded, by dubious statutory interpre-
tation, that the statute did not reach Mrs. Bond’s conduct. Thus, her 
conviction must be overturned—the right result, but for the wrong 
reason. For the majority, that was the end of the case. 
41 Id. at 2092. 
42 Id. at 2102.
43 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (2014).
44 Id. at 2093 (emphasis added).
45 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
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II. Can a Treaty Increase the Legislative Power of Congress?46 
But for Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, the statute is crystal 
clear, and it clearly covers Mrs. Bond’s conduct. So they are obliged 
to answer a momentous constitutional question: did Congress have 
power to enact the statute in the first place?
As to this point, the government argued that, because the United 
States has entered into a treaty about chemical weapons, Congress 
automatically has the power to enact a statute on this subject, even 
if it would have lacked this power otherwise. It argued, in other 
words, that a treaty can increase the legislative power of Congress. For 
this proposition, it relied on a single sentence from Missouri v. Hol-
land: “If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity 
of the [implementing] statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and 
proper means to execute the powers of the government.”47
Cato filed a brief as amicus, based on my Harvard Law Review arti-
cle, arguing that Missouri v. Holland is wrong on this point and should 
be overruled.48 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed with 
us, adopting not just our conclusion but our reasoning as well. Cato’s 
record at the Court is remarkably good,49 but it is rare that an opin-
ion ends up tracking our brief so closely. 
A. Text
The two relevant clauses of the Constitution are the Necessary 
and Proper Clause and the Treaty Clause, though you would never 
know it from Justice Holmes’s cryptic opinion in Missouri v. Holland. 
“Justice Holmes did not quote either the Treaty Clause or the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, let alone discuss how they fit together 
grammatically. Indeed, it is striking to find that the phrase ‘neces-
sary and proper’ and the phrase ‘to make treaties’ never appear in 
46 This part is largely derived from Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Justice Scalia’s 
Masterful Concurrence in Bond v. United States, Volokh Conspiracy (June 3, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/03/
justice-scalias-masterful-concurrence-in-bond-v-united-states.
47 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
48 Cato Brief, supra note 11, at 2; Rosenkranz, supra note 10, at 1867. 
49 See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, Cato Went 10-1 at Supreme Court This Term, Cato at Liberty 
(Jul. 2, 2014), http://www.cato.org/blog/cato-went-10-1-supreme-court-term.
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the same sentence in the United States Reports.”50 But now, at last, they 
shall. Justice Scalia quotes both clauses and carefully conjoins them: 
“Read together, the two Clauses empower Congress to pass laws 
‘necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . [the] Power . . . 
to make Treaties.’”51
Once the clauses are properly conjoined, it becomes clear that they 
do not give Congress the power that the government claimed in this 
case. Per Justice Scalia: “It is obvious what the Clauses, read together, 
do not say. They do not authorize Congress to enact laws for carry-
ing into execution ‘Treaties.’”52 The key phrase is the infinitive “to 
make”: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . [the] 
Power . . . to make Treaties.”
As Justice Scalia explains: “the power of the President and the Sen-
ate ‘to make’ a Treaty cannot possibly mean to ‘enter into a com-
pact with a foreign nation and then give that compact domestic legal 
effect.’ ”53 The distinction between “making” a treaty and giving it 
domestic legal effect goes back at least as far as Blackstone.54 As Jus-
tice Scalia writes: “Upon the President’s agreement and the Senate’s 
ratification, a treaty . . . has been made and is not susceptible of any 
more making.”55
In short, as Justice Scalia explains:
[A] power to help the President make treaties is not a power to 
implement treaties already made. See generally Rosenkranz, 
Executing the Treaty Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1867 (2005). 
50 Rosenkranz, supra note 10, at 1882 (emphasis in original).
51 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment).
52 Id. at 2098 (emphasis in original); see also Rosenkranz, supra note 10, at 1882 (“The 
Power granted to Congress is emphatically not the power to make laws for carrying 
into execution ‘the treaty power,’ let alone the power to make laws for carrying into 
execution ‘all treaties.’”). 
53 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2099 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Rosenkranz, 
supra note 10, at 1884 (“Nor will it do to say that the phrase ‘make Treaties’ is a term 
of art meaning ‘conclude treaties with foreign nations and then give them domestic 
legal effect.’”).
54 Rosenkranz, supra note 10, at 1867.
55 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2098 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Rosenkranz, 
supra note 10, at 1884 (“The ‘Power . . . to make Treaties’ is exhausted once a treaty is 
ratified; implementation is something else altogether.”) (emphasis in original).
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Once a treaty has been made, Congress’s power to do what 
is “necessary and proper” to assist the making of treaties 
drops out of the picture. To legislate compliance with the 
United States’ treaty obligations, Congress must rely upon 
its independent (though quite robust) Article I, § 8, powers.56 
In this case, Congress could not rely on any other Article I, Section 
8, power (oddly, the government waived reliance on the Commerce 
Clause), and so the statute should have fallen.
B. Structure
The textual point coheres perfectly with constitutional structure. 
Justice Scalia begins with the constitutional axiom that Congress has 
limited and enumerated powers, and then explains how the govern-
ment’s argument would constitute a “loophole” to that fundamental 
principle.57 If the government is right, “then the possibilities of what 
the Federal Government may accomplish, with the right treaty in 
hand, are endless and hardly farfetched . . . . It could begin, as some 
scholars have suggested, with abrogation of this Court’s constitu-
tional rulings.”58 But this is, as Justice Scalia says, “the least of the 
problem.”59 The government’s position “places Congress only one 
treaty away from acquiring a general police power.”60 This is an un-
thinkable result: countless canonical opinions insist that Congress 
can have no such power.
To see the point another way, consider that, under Reid v. Covert, 
a treaty cannot empower Congress to violate the Bill of Rights.61 But 
under Missouri v. Holland, the Tenth Amendment is treated differ-
ently: a treaty can empower Congress to exceed its enumerated pow-
ers and violate the Tenth Amendment. This distinction is untenable. 
“The distinction between provisions protecting individual liberty, 
on the one hand, and ‘structural’ provisions, on the other, cannot 
be the explanation, since structure in general—and especially the 
56 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2099 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in 
original).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 2100.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 2101.
61 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality).
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structure of limited federal powers—is designed to protect individual 
liberty.”62 Reid and Holland cannot be reconciled; Reid is right and 
Holland is wrong.
This leaves one last quirk. If a self-executing treaty can reach mat-
ters other than those in Article I, Section 8, isn’t it odd to say that a 
non-self-executing treaty followed by an implementing statute can-
not? At first glance, this may seem anomalous, but it actually makes 
perfect structural sense. Justice Scalia explains:
Suppose, for example, that the self-aggrandizing Federal 
Government wishes to take over the law of intestacy. If the 
President and the Senate find some foreign state as a ready 
accomplice, they have two options. First, they can enter into a 
treaty with “stipulations” specific enough that they “require 
no legislation to make them operative,” Whitney v. Robertson, 
124 U. S. 190, 194 (1888), which would mean in this example 
something like a comprehensive probate code. But for that 
to succeed, the President and a supermajority of the Senate 
would need to reach agreement on all the details—which, 
when once embodied in the treaty, could not be altered or 
superseded by ordinary legislation. The second option—far 
the better one—is for Congress to gain lasting and flexible 
control over the law of intestacy by means of a non-self-
executing treaty. “[Implementing] legislation is as much 
subject to modification and repeal by Congress as legislation 
upon any other subject.” Ibid. And to make such a treaty, the 
President and Senate would need to agree only that they 
desire power over the law of intestacy.63
One could say the same thing about family law:
[A]ssume that the federal government desires power that 
it would otherwise lack over some subject matter—say, for 
example, family law. One option would be to make a self-
executing treaty with the prolixity of a family law code, 
which would, of its own force, constitute the family law of 
the United States. This option is unlikely to be very tempting, 
however, because it would require that the President and 
two-thirds of the Senate agree on a particular family law 
code, to be frozen into the treaty (and arguably beyond the 
62 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2101 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in 
original); see also Cato Brief, supra note 11, at 21. 
63 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2101–02 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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power of Congress to amend or supersede). But if Justice 
Holmes were correct, there would be a second option: the 
United States could enter into a non-self-executing treaty that 
simply promised (to attempt) to regulate family law in the 
United States “in a manner that best protects the institution 
of the family.” This treaty would be far more tempting to the 
treatymakers on the American side, because it would require 
the President and two-thirds of the Senate to agree on only 
one thing: that they want power over family law.64
The ultimate point here is that “the Constitution should not be 
construed to create this doubly perverse incentive—an incentive to 
enter ‘entangling alliances’ merely to attain the desired side effect of 
increased domestic legislative power.”65 This deep structural prob-
lem can be solved only by repudiating Missouri v. Holland and hold-
ing that a treaty cannot increase the legislative power of Congress.
III. Are There Subject-Matter Limitations on the Scope of the 
Treaty Power?
A. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence
The discussion above has an unspoken premise: Justice Scalia as-
sumed that the treaty itself was a valid treaty. It is this assumption 
that sets up the question of whether the treaty can increase the leg-
islative power of Congress. Justice Scalia made that assumption be-
cause the parties did too. Mrs. Bond did not argue that the president 
lacked the power to enter into the treaty, and she did not contend 
that the treaty itself was invalid.
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence about 
the scope of the treaty power, which Justices Scalia and Alito joined. 
The Constitution provides that “The President . . . shall have Power, 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Trea-
ties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”66 As 
Justice Thomas points out, though: “The Constitution does not . . . 
comprehensively define the proper bounds of the Treaty Power, and 
this Court has not yet had occasion to do so.”67 In other words, the 
64 Rosenkranz, supra note 10, at 1930 (emphasis in original).
65 Id. at 1932.
66 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
67 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Constitution spells out the procedure for making treaties, but it does 
not expressly define the word “Treaties” or specify what are proper 
treaties under the clause. “As a result,” explains Justice Thomas, 
“some have suggested that the Treaty Power is boundless—that it 
can reach any subject matter, even those that are of strictly domestic 
concern.”68 
This is a startling suggestion, especially when combined with the 
Missouri v. Holland point discussed above.69 Again, Missouri v. Hol-
land seemed to say that Congress automatically has power to make 
a law implementing a treaty, even if it would have lacked the power 
to make that same law absent the treaty. It seemed to say, in other 
words, that a treaty can increase the legislative powers of Congress. 
If this is so, and if it is correct that a treaty “can reach any subject 
matter, even those that are of strictly domestic concern,”70 then “the 
legislative powers are not merely somewhat expandable by treaty; 
they are expandable virtually without limit.”71 
Justice Thomas emphatically rejects that possibility. First, he joins 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, concluding that Missouri v. Holland is 
wrong: a treaty cannot increase the legislative power of Congress. 
Second, he “write[s] separately to suggest that the Treaty Power is 
itself a limited federal power.”72 
The balance of his concurrence is a thorough and scholarly his-
torical exploration of what those limits might be. His opinion is a 
model of originalism—parsing early treatises, Founding-era diction-
aries, pre-constitutional practice, constitutional ratification debates, 
the Jay Treaty debates, and any other source that might shed light 
on the original meaning of the word “Treaties.” And while he does 
not reach a final conclusion—again, Mrs. Bond did not challenge the 
validity of the treaty in this case—Justice Thomas does find power-
ful historical evidence “suggesting that the Treaty Power can be used to 
68 Id. at 2100 (citing Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States § 302, cmt. c (1986)).
69 See supra Part II.
70 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
71 Rosenkranz, supra note 10, at 1893.
72 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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arrange intercourse with other nations, but not to regulate purely domestic 
affairs.”73
This distinction is quite plausible. It makes good structural sense, 
and Justice Thomas’s historical evidence is compelling. In practice, 
however, it might prove to be a very difficult line to draw. Justice 
Thomas recognizes this problem, but he insists that the Court should 
not be daunted:
In an appropriate case, I would draw a line that respects the 
original understanding of the Treaty Power. I acknowledge 
that the distinction between matters of international 
intercourse and matters of purely domestic regulation may 
not be obvious in all cases. But this Court has long recognized 
that the Treaty Power is limited, and hypothetical difficulties 
in line-drawing are no reason to ignore a constitutional limit 
on federal power.74 
B. Justice Alito’s Concurrence
Justice Alito’s opinion is, in some ways, the most intriguing of 
them all. But to understand its significance, it is crucial to recall 
where he stands on the other three opinions. 
Again, the majority opinion held that the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention Implementation Act did not reach Mrs. Bond’s conduct. For 
those six justices, that conclusion is enough to decide the case: her 
conviction must be overturned. But Justice Alito did not sign on to 
the majority opinion; instead, he signed onto the statutory interpre-
tation section of Justice Scalia’s opinion, concluding that the statute 
clearly does reach her conduct. This conclusion cannot end the case, 
because Mrs. Bond’s constitutional arguments remain.
Justice Scalia’s opinion concludes that Missouri v. Holland is wrong: 
a treaty cannot increase the legislative power of Congress. Since the 
treaty could not sustain the statute, the statute could not constitu-
tionally be applied to Mrs. Bond. For Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Thomas, that conclusion resolves the case: Mrs. Bond’s conviction 
must be overturned. So those two opinions suffice to resolve the case 
73 Id. (emphasis added).
74 Id. at 2110.
CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW
302
for eight of the justices. But Justice Alito did not join that part of Jus-
tice Scalia’s opinion.
Justice Thomas’s opinion “suggest[s]”75 a possible limit on the 
president’s power to make treaties, and Justice Alito does join that 
opinion. But nowhere in that opinion does Justice Thomas suggest 
that anything is wrong with this particular treaty. Again, Mrs. Bond 
conceded the validity of the treaty, and so Justice Thomas had no 
occasion to second-guess it or to apply his proposed “international 
intercourse” test to the present case. His disposition of the case was 
already determined by Justice Scalia’s opinion, which he joined. 
So, as a matter of logic, Justice Alito’s votes on the prior three opin-
ions do not suffice to decide the case. Absent an opinion of his own, 
there would not be enough information to determine why he votes 
to reverse. With that context in mind, it is interesting to parse his 
one-page concurrence in the judgment. Here is the constitutional 
analysis in full:
For the reasons set out in Parts I–III of JUSTICE THOMAS’ 
concurring opinion, which I join, I believe that the treaty 
power is limited to agreements that address matters of 
legitimate international concern. The treaty pursuant to 
which §229 was enacted, the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
is not self-executing, and thus the Convention itself does 
not have domestic effect without congressional action. The 
control of true chemical weapons, as that term is customarily 
understood, is a matter of great international concern, and 
therefore the heart of the Convention clearly represents a valid 
exercise of the treaty power. But insofar as the Convention 
may be read to obligate the United States to enact domestic 
legislation criminalizing conduct of the sort at issue in this 
case, which typically is the sort of conduct regulated by the 
States, the Convention exceeds the scope of the treaty power. 
Section 229 cannot be regarded as necessary and proper to 
carry into execution the treaty power, and accordingly it lies 
outside Congress’ reach unless supported by some other 
power enumerated in the Constitution. The Government has 
presented no such justification for this statute.76
75 Id. at 2103, 2105, 2109. 
76 Id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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This is a rich and dense paragraph, but it seems perhaps a bit too 
quick. Justice Alito may well be right that “the treaty power is lim-
ited to agreements that address matters of legitimate international 
concern.” But simply adverting to Justice Thomas’s opinion may not 
suffice to make the point. After all, by its own terms, Justice Thomas’s 
opinion merely “suggests”77 such a limit; remember, Justice Thomas 
joined Justice Scalia’s opinion, so for him, any limits on the treaty 
power were not necessary to decide the case. And, in any event, Jus-
tice Thomas’s opinion “suggest[ed]” that the treaty power was lim-
ited to “matters of international intercourse,”78 whereas Justice Alito 
adopts a subtly different formulation: “matters of legitimate interna-
tional concern.”79 One can imagine that these two different formula-
tions might have substantially different consequences. 
The heart of Justice Alito’s opinion is this passage: 
But insofar as the Convention may be read to obligate the 
United States to enact domestic legislation criminalizing 
conduct of the sort at issue in this case, which typically is 
the sort of conduct regulated by the States, the Convention 
exceeds the scope of the treaty power. Section 229 cannot 
be regarded as necessary and proper to carry into execution 
the treaty power, and accordingly it lies outside Congress’ 
reach.80
 The key word here is “insofar.” Did the convention in fact oblige 
the United States to enact Section 229? The word “insofar” is a neat 
hedge, but the opinion is rather striking either way. Consider both 
possibilities.
First, assume that the answer is yes. If so, then Justice Alito con-
cludes that the treaty “exceeds the scope of the treaty power.” In 
225 years, the Court has never declared a treaty unconstitutional.81 
Even Justice Thomas, who wrote separately to suggest limits on the 
treaty power, did not endeavor to apply his suggested limits to this 
77 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
78 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2104 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
79 Id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
80 Id.
81 See Cong. Research Serv., The Constitution of the United States of America: 
Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 112-9, at 508 (Centennial ed. 2014) (“It does 
not appear that the Court has ever held a treaty unconstitutional.”).
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particular treaty, let alone declare it unconstitutional. Moreover, 
Mrs. Bond herself did not argue that this treaty is unconstitutional. 
If, in fact, Justice Alito meant to declare this treaty unconstitutional 
sua sponte, that would be a dramatic and important conclusion, wor-
thy of a more comprehensive opinion. 
Alternatively, assume that the answer is no: the word “insofar” 
also leaves open the possibility that the convention is not best read 
to obligate the United States to enact the statute at issue in this case. 
If not, then the treaty is presumably valid and constitutional. But 
then, consider Justice Alito’s next sentence: “Section 229 cannot be 
regarded as necessary and proper to carry into execution the treaty 
power, and accordingly it lies outside Congress’ reach.” The logic 
here seems to be that if a treaty does not “obligate” the United States 
to enact a particular statute (as we are assuming in this paragraph), 
then it cannot empower Congress to enact that statute. 
Now, Cato certainly agrees with that proposition; it is a fortiori 
from our brief, from my article, and from Justice Scalia’s concur-
rence. We would say that a treaty cannot empower Congress to enact 
a statute even if the treaty does purport to obligate Congress to do so, 
let alone if it does not. But again, Justice Alito did not sign on to that 
part of Justice Scalia’s concurrence. So, for him, this is a new propo-
sition of law. The logical summary of this position is as follows: a 
valid treaty that does obligate Congress “to enact domestic legisla-
tion criminalizing . . . the sort of conduct [typically] regulated by 
the States” might empower Congress to enact such legislation (Hol-
land says yes; Scalia and Cato and I say no; Justice Alito does not 
say); but a valid treaty that does not obligate (but perhaps cajoles?) 
Congress to pass such legislation cannot empower Congress to do so. 
This might be right, but it is new and important, and it is in tension 
with at least a few cases (which seem to suggest that implementing 
legislation need only be rationally related to a treaty).82 Again, if this 
82 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920); United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 
79, 84 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914, 920 (S.D. Cal. 1957) 
(“Although no mention of marihuana is made in the treaties, marihuana is definitely 
related to the drug problem and the evils that flow from the use of drugs. A statute 
which has its impact on both the drugs named in the treaty and on marihuana, related 
as it is to the drug addiction problem, would seem to us a valid statute to implement a 
valid treaty.” (footnote omitted)); see also Rosenkranz, supra note 10, at 1931.
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is the true gravamen of Justice Alito’s concurrence, then it is a very 
important point, worthy of a more detailed opinion.
In short, Justice Alito clearly has subtle intuitions about the scope 
of the treaty power and about the scope of Congress’s power to leg-
islate pursuant to treaty. Unfortunately, there are only hints of these 
intuitions in his rich but cryptic concurrence. At any rate, Justice 
Alito correctly concludes that the statute “lies outside Congress’ 
reach” and so cannot constitutionally be applied to Mrs. Bond.83
Conclusion
Bond v. United States was, in a way, a disappointment; many had 
hoped that the Court would at last disavow Justice Holmes’s perni-
cious suggestion that a treaty can increase the legislative power of 
Congress. Instead, a majority of the Court avoided this important 
issue, but only by an implausible stretch of statutory interpretation.
The Court should generally be commended for avoiding difficult 
constitutional questions when it is fairly possible to do so. But the 
Roberts Court seems to take this principle too far. When the statute 
is clear and the constitutional issue is squarely presented, there is 
no “judicial restraint” in rewriting the statute to dodge the constitu-
tional question. As Justice Scalia says:
We have here a supposedly “narrow” opinion which, in order 
to be “narrow,” sets forth interpretive principles never before 
imagined that will bedevil our jurisprudence (and proliferate 
litigation) for years to come. The immediate product of these 
interpretive novelties is a statute that should be the envy of 
every lawmaker bent on trapping the unwary with vague 
and uncertain criminal prohibitions. All this to leave in place 
an ill-considered ipse dixit that enables the fundamental 
constitutional principle of limited federal powers to be set 
aside by the President and Senate’s exercise of the treaty 
power. We should not have shirked our duty and distorted 
the law to preserve that assertion; we should have welcomed 
and eagerly grasped the opportunity—nay, the obligation—
to consider and repudiate it.84 
83 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
84 Id. at 2102 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Happily, though, three justices did grasp this opportunity. Justice 
Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, wrote an originalist tour 
de force suggesting “that the Treaty Power can be used to arrange 
intercourse with other nations, but not to regulate purely domestic 
affairs.”85 
And Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, produced a textual 
and structural masterpiece, concluding that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause does not empower Congress to implement treaties. 
“To legislate compliance with the United States’ treaty obligations, 
Congress must rely on its independent (though quite robust) Article 
I, § 8, powers.”86 
As for Missouri v. Holland, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito all 
agree that it “upheld a statute implementing [a] treaty based on 
an improperly broad view of the Necessary and Proper Clause.”87 
Two of them—Scalia and Thomas—went further and made clear 
that a treaty cannot increase the legislative power of Congress; Mis-
souri v. Holland’s single “unreasoned and citation-less sentence”88 
to the contrary was an “ill-considered ipse dixit”89 that should be 
“repudiate[d].”90
Unfortunately, these were concurrences, not majorities. However, 
it is important to remember that the other six justices expressed 
no view about whether a treaty can increase the legislative power 
of Congress. These powerful concurrences went unanswered, and 
they may well provide a roadmap in a future case. Missouri v. Hol-
land remains the law of the land, but in a proper case, it may yet be 
overruled.
85 Id. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
86 Id. at 2099 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
87 Id. at 2109 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
88 Id. at 2098 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
89 Id. at 2102; see also Rosenkranz, supra note 10, at 1932.
90 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2102 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
